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This paper concentrates on the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and more specifically compares 
the very different means Indonesia and Malaysia used to handle the crisis. Malaysia was 
the only country who refused IMF’s help during the crisis, and its methods to overcome the 
crisis are compared to Indonesia’s methods which borrowed funds from the IMF. The paper 
aims to study how Malaysia’s policies helped them to distribute wealth more evenly and led 
to rapid recovery from the crisis. 
 
Indonesia’s recovery took longer than Malaysia’s, but it has been able to over-grow from its 
pre-crisis levels in financial indicators, such as GDP growth and foreign direct investment. 
However, the equal income distribution has been inadequate. When recovering from the 
crisis, the IMF cut government spending in subsidies and projects, which led to more poverty 
and unemployment. Alternatively, Malaysia did just the opposite: it boosted the economy, 
lowered interest rates and improved liquidity. 
 
The US and the IMF had advertised towards open economies for years and one of its cures 
to the crisis was to open the economies even more to foreign investors, in the hope that the 
markets would correct themselves. They failed to under-stand that the rapid opening of the 
Asian markets had led to the crisis at the first place. Malaysia disagreed and imposed gov-
ernmental control towards capital markets, and increased government involvement in other 
areas as well. Malaysia’s cure seemed to work, since the signs of recovery were already 
seen quickly after the crisis and its economy was not affected as much as Indonesia’s. 
 
The IMF has had a rough path explaining the differences, since the Malaysian policies 
worked better than Indonesia’s and as it was able to recover quicker and distribute its wealth 
more evenly. Thus, the IMF has been forced to admit some of its mistakes. The IMF’s ability 
to change has been somewhat slow and most of the critiques feel that advances should be 
made in the organizations openness, transparency and power distribution. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis focuses on the 1997 Asian financial crisis and compares two countries differ-
ent methods on solving the crisis: Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s. The research focuses on 
the different styles of economic methods of these two countries and concentrates espe-
cially on the International Monetary Funds (IMF) role as an advisor and lender. The paper 
tries to answer also to the question how the IMF’s lending affected the outcome of Indo-
nesia compared to Malaysia, which did not lend from the IMF, as well as to the question 
where the IMF policies failed and how they could be improved. 
 
Indonesia was highly affected by the Asian financial crisis starting in 1997, when the Thai 
baht started to depreciate, weighing down the stock markets and other currencies. The 
Indonesian rupiah started to depreciate quickly as well, causing huge losses to Indone-
sian companies and banks. Unable to have financing from foreign investors the govern-
ment asked financial assistance from the IMF. In return the IMF required to several re-
form measures to take place; such as closing down a number of banks, cutting down on 
subsidies and raising of interest rates. During 1997 and 1998 the Indonesian government 
made four funding programs with the IMF. Nevertheless, even with the financial support 
the rupiah still kept depreciating and in the same time the general price levels rose, af-
fecting most to the poor, ultimately leading to riots and unstable political environment. 
(Thee, 2012) 
 
Malaysia also suffered greatly from the financial crisis, when the ringgit, affected by the 
other Asian currencies, started to devalue in July, leading to a stock market collapse 
(Ariff & Abubakar, 2007). However, Malaysia refused help from the IMF and its policy 
measures were somewhat different than Indonesia’s. It reduced interest rates to boost 
the economy and imposed capital controls to prevent the further fall of the ringgit 
(Nambiar, 2009). Malaysia started slowly to recover already in 1998, while Indonesia 
continued to struggle (Thee, 2012).  
 
The thesis intends to analyze which factors led to recovery in both of the countries and 
how they have sustained that recovery throughout time and whether the outcome would 
have been different if different methods had been used, as well as if the IMF’s policies 
could be improved and what type of measures the organization could take to develop 
them. 
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1.1 Aims of the Research and Research Problem 
 
The aim of the research is to compare Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s economic situations 
before, during and after the Asian crisis and analyze which factors contributed to the 
crises. This paper concentrates on the IMF’s influence in Indonesia’s ways to tackle the 
crisis and compares those to the different methods used by Malaysia. It analyzes how 
the IMF lending affected Indonesia and its recovery compared to Malaysia. The aim is to 
try to find if there is any correlation between the IMF lending with the recovery’s speed 
and stability and also, to determine whether Malaysia could have benefited from lending 
from the IMF or if Indonesia would have been better without the lending program. With 
the information now available, the hypothesis of the research is that the IMF’s methods 
did not help Indonesia with the crisis and the recovery could have been more stable 
without the IMF’s arrangements. 
 
Secondly this paper aims to give a clear view of the IMF’s rationale behind its policies 
and to find out why some of its practices were criticized. The research paper also evalu-
ates the criticism and suggests few measures the IMF could do to satisfy its critiques 
and improve its methods. In addition the paper attempts to shed light on the reasons 
behind Indonesia’s case and see if the critiques would have delivered a different outcome 
for Indonesia if different methods than the ones recommended by the IMF had been 
used. The paper could give guidance to governments and for the IMF whether the lend-
ing programs are helpful, how helpful they can be and suggests few areas of improve-
ment. 
 
The core research question is: How did the IMF’s lending affect Indonesia’s recovery 
from the Asian financial crisis in 1997 compared to Malaysia, which did not accept the 
IMF’s help? And what can governments and the IMF learn from the differences? 
 
1.2 Limitations 
 
Possible problem with the research is that the hypothesis might influence the sources 
and thus the outcome of the research. However information has been retrieved from a 
range of different sources, thereby helping the thesis to remain as objective as possible.  
Another restriction is the countries’ different situations at the time and whether it is pos-
sible to draw conclusions about cause and effect because of these. It is also difficult to 
guess what would have happened if Malaysia would have agreed to IMF funding or if 
Indonesia would not, since there is no way of knowing these counterfactuals. 
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Other limitations are that data from both countries is not necessarily available. This might 
make comparison more difficult, since information sources are scarce and not all factors 
can be regarded as comparable or even appropriate to the research. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
The thesis will be comprised of secondary research and the information will consist of 
several books, academic journal articles and online sources to give an overall picture of 
the problem from different perspectives. The data will be also collected from previous 
researches on the topic as well as through several databases, Indonesia’s and Malay-
sia’s government publications, and World Bank statistics. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Research Paper 
 
The research will consist of three sections: in the first the main events of the Asian finan-
cial crisis are introduced and the main reasons behind the crisis are represented as well 
as the core functions of the IMF and World Bank. The IMF’s agenda is to help countries 
with financial difficulties by lending them money, but to be able to get the funding the 
countries need to comply with IMF’s policies to overcome the crisis. To fully understand 
the research questions it is quite vital to know why IMF is funding the countries, when 
and why the IMF was founded and what are its main duties. 
 
The World Banks agenda is only explained briefly, since it is not that critical performer 
with these types of lending programs, however it is quite intertwined with the IMF, so it 
is helpful to understand its mandate. 
 
The second part will compare the two countries before, during and after the crisis and 
the third part will consist of the IMF’s reasoning behind the lending conditions and the 
theory behind it, as well as critique of those conditions and some ideas how to improve 
its methods in the future. 
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2 Overview of the Crisis and Key Players 
 
The following subchapters will explain the main characteristics of the IMF and World 
Bank and briefly introduce the origins and events of the Asian financial crisis, to give an 
overall picture of the two organizations and the struggles they and the Asian countries 
faced. 
  
2.1 The International Monetary Fund 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was founded in 1945. After World War 2 and the 
1930’s Great Depression there was a need for cooperation between countries to provide 
advice and resolutions to avoid financial problems and exchange rate difficulties (Bakker, 
1997, ss. 11-13). Therefore the IMF was established in the UN conference in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, United States. Its goals were to reduce foreign exchange re-
strictions, stabilize exchange rates and lend funds to countries experiencing temporary 
balance of payments problems (Danaher, 1994, p. 1). 
 
The IMF’s founding policies were the work of two economic theorists, John Maynard 
Keynes and Harry Dexter White. Keynes envisaged the IMF as a world’s central bank 
that could create money on its own authority and as an institution that could lend money 
to governments while being greatly autonomous, so that no political influence could af-
fect its decision-making. White, however, promoted the idea that the financial assistance 
should be in provision with the member countries contributions. The result was some-
what compromise of these two ideologies. The IMF finances its loans to member coun-
tries by requiring the funding from the reserves of other member countries, while the 
money lent from the other countries to the IMF can be recalled in short notice making 
the money reserve quite liquid. Nevertheless, Keynes’ theories are more widely noted 
and the idea behind IMF basic philosophy is often referred to as coming from Keynes. 
(Bakker, 1997, pp. 11-12) 
 
Today the IMF is an organization of 189 countries. On its own website, the IMF says that 
its tasks are working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, 
facilitate international trade, promote high employment, advocate sustainable economic 
growth and reduce poverty around the world. (IMF, 2017) 
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In the Article 1 in the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund the pur-
poses of the International Monetary Fund are stated as: 
 
 (i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institu-
tion which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on interna-
tional monetary problems. 
 (ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employ-
ment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all 
members as primary objectives of economic policy. 
 (iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements 
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
 (iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign ex-
change restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 
 (v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them 
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without 
resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity. 
 (vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree 
of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members. 
(Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 1994) 
 
The main activities of the IMF are surveillance over the monetary and exchange rate 
policies of its member countries, issuing policy recommendations to members, supervis-
ing the international supply of liquidity, and providing loans to member countries experi-
encing balance of payments problems. The aim for the additional credit is to help the 
country in question to rebuild its international reserves, stabilize its currency, continue its 
ability to pay for imports and restore economic growth. In general, the idea is that If a 
member country cannot fulfill its financial obligations to other countries because of a 
shortage of available cash, this country may borrow from the IMF. With these IMF funds, 
member countries are theoretically able to buy time to fix their economic policies and to 
restore growth without having to undertake drastic actions, thereby possibly harming the 
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other member countries. Smaller financial support is often loaned without major condi-
tions, but countries in need of considerable funding should fulfill certain policy conditions 
to be able to get the credit. This conditionality is to serve two purposes: to ensure that 
the country getting the funding aims to correct its policies to restore the balance and that 
it will be able to pay the loan back. (Bakker, 1997, pp. 15-30) 
 
2.2 World Bank 
 
Like the IMF, the World Bank was established after the World War 2 in 1944. Unlike IMF 
the World Bank provides low-interest loans, credits, and grants to developing countries 
mainly for development projects. This funding is used for investments in education, 
health, public administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector development, 
agriculture, and environmental and natural resource management. Some of their projects 
are co-financed with governments, commercial banks, export credit agencies, and pri-
vate sector investors and other multilateral institutions, such as the IMF. (World Bank, 
2017) 
 
Thus, the idea of IMF and World Bank funding is different, but together with the IMF the 
World Bank also provides balance of payments funding, usually through structural ad-
justment policies or other conditions negotiated by the IMF with the country in question. 
(Williams, 1994) 
 
2.3 Asian Financial Crisis 
 
In a report made by the World Bank in 1993 it states that “East Asia has a remarkable 
record of high and sustained economic growth. From 1965 to 1990 the twenty-three 
economies of East Asia grew faster than all other regions of the world” (World Bank, 
1993). This quote describes quite perfectly the widespread view of the Asian economies 
at the beginning of the 1990s. The East Asian countries were described as “tiger econ-
omies”, having long periods of rapid growth and the countries seemed like a good and 
stable investment. During the 1980-1990s the US dollar was also exchanging at quite 
low levels and most of the Asian countries pegged their currency to the dollar to be able 
to have favorable exchange rates (Johnson, 2000, pp. 204-209). 
 
However, in the summer of 1997 some of the foreign investors realized that they had lent 
vast amounts of money to companies with huge debts and quite low levels of equity. 
They feared that other investors, especially the huge US hedge funds, would notice the 
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same. Thus, the investors started to withdraw their money from the area, scared that all 
the investors would notice the same and the aggregate effect would be enormous, forc-
ing the Asian economies to de-peg their currencies from the dollar and devalue them. 
However, when a few investors started to withdraw their money, the other investors pan-
icked as well and the scenario described above is precisely what happened (Johnson, 
2000, p. 209). In July 1997, with investors pulling money out of the country and currency 
speculators attacking the currencies, the pressure for the Thai government to keep its 
currency, baht, pegged to US dollar came too tough for the government to bear and it 
decided to abandon the peg and allow the baht to float freely. This resulted in the over-
night collapse of the baht. This made other Asian currencies vulnerable to changes as 
well and when investors in the currency markets started to sell their Asian currencies, 
these started to depreciate too (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 47-50). 
 
The Asian central banks used billions of dollars to support their currencies, but the at-
tempts failed and soon they ran out of funds and needed the IMF’s assistance (Stiglitz, 
2006, p. 34). In August 1997, the IMF gave its first support package to Asia. However, 
the aid did not stabilize the markets and in half a year the Thai baht had lost about 55 
percent of its value, with Malaysia’s ringgit losing 40 percent and Indonesia’s rupiah more 
than 80 percent (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 47-50). 
 
The huge depreciation of the currencies affected the investors in the stock market as 
well. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange lost 63 percent of its value in just one year. The 
credit agencies then started to lower their country ratings of the suffering economies, 
thus making the remaining investors alarmed, which resulted in a massive drop of stock 
prices. (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 51-52) 
 
The currency crisis and the plummeting stock prices resulted in an economic crisis 
throughout the whole of Asia, having several consequences for various countries. The 
IMF responded to the financial crisis by funding the crisis countries so that they could 
sustain the exchange rates. The total bailout package for the Asian countries was $95 
billion. The idea was that if the market believed there was enough money in the reserves, 
there would be no point attacking the currency and the confidence would be restored 
while at the same time the companies that had foreign debt could now easily obtain 
dollars and pay back the loans. However, the wealthy people inside those countries now 
saw an opportunity for escape and converted their money into dollars at a favorable 
exchange rate and then moved the money abroad. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 95-96) 
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In return for the aid the IMF insisted that the governments should implement several 
conditions such as austerity measures, tax increases, high interest rates and the sales 
of indebted firms, mostly to foreign investors. The IMF thought these measures would 
restore the economic health to the “Asian tigers” and by extension strengthen their, and 
the world’s, faith in an open American-style capitalism (Johnson, 2000, p. 211). However, 
the conditions and high interest rates made the local companies incapable of paying 
back their loans and interests, leading to massive bankruptcies and eventually to a bank-
ing crisis (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 34). 
 
2.3.1 The Influence of the United States 
 
During the 1980s the Japanese trade was really beginning to have a negative impact on 
the American economy, so in 1985 the US and Japan made an agreement, called the 
Plaza Accord, to manipulate the exchange rates so that Japanese yen would increase in 
value and make the US dollar cheaper. Thus making US exports more affordable in the 
market. The Plaza Accord’s aim was to decrease the US trade deficit with Japan, and 
the US government hoped that the regime would correct the trade imbalance by itself. 
However, the agreement only affected the prices of the goods, and no action was taken 
to end Japanese barriers against imports or to reduce the amount of Japanese goods 
coming to the US. Also, Japan’s reaction to the high yen value was to minimize the costs 
with excessive mass production and lowering the interest rates, so that it would be able 
to continue its export-oriented growth. This resulted in industrial overcapacity and helped 
create the Asian bubble. By 1995 Japan still had a huge surplus of savings, which it 
invested in the US Treasury Bonds, allowing the US to gain more debt and keep its 
interest rates low, even though at the same time some of the Japanese banks were 
struggling to finance themselves. Thus, the situation started becoming more difficult and 
between 1995 and 1997 the Japan and the US agreed to reverse the Plaza Accord, 
allowing the yen gradually to decrease to 60 percent against the dollar. (Johnson, 2000, 
pp. 202-204) 
 
However, during the 1990s when the Plaza Accord was still in place, many East Asian 
economies had pegged their currencies to the low dollar, with different types of fixed float 
regimes. This meant that as long as the dollar was low their price levels were also low, 
which gave the East Asian countries an advantageous position compared to other coun-
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tries, and to Japan. But when the dollar became more expensive, the Asian exports sud-
denly came more expensive as well. These pegged currencies also gave the impression 
that the currencies were quite safe from exchange fluctuations, thus making the banks 
more eager to lend money even with higher risk. (Johnson, 2000, pp. 204-206) 
 
With this advantageous situation, the East Asian countries experienced rapid growth 
through their exports, and in 1996 half of the global foreign investment went to Asia. This 
“hot money” however, was not especially needed in most of the Asian economies since 
in most cases the countries had high savings rates by themselves. (Johnson, 2000, pp. 
204-206) 
 
Additional US influence on the East Asian economies was the US’s persistence of open-
ing up the countries to free trade and free capital movement. Around 1992-1997 the US 
government had used its influence and pressured the Asian governments towards looser 
capital markets. However, this left the governments more defenseless to market move-
ments, especially since many of the countries did not have legal and institutional systems 
needed for regulating the higher exposure to market volatilities. Another huge influence, 
especially for the smaller East Asian countries, was the founding of Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation forum (APEC) in 1989.  The US started to support the APEC espe-
cially in 1993 to improve the Asian economies ability to handle the foreign money offered 
to them. APEC became one of the leaders in promoting globalization to “the tiger econ-
omies” of Asia. American theorists declared that opening up to markets was necessary 
and beneficial to the economies so they would not be left behind with the growth. In the 
APEC meetings in 1994 and 1995 all the members agreed on opening their economies 
and to invest into the Pacific by 2020. In November 1997, with the Asian financial crisis 
already in place, the US still pushed for rapid removals of tariffs and barriers in fifteen 
different economic sectors. By November 1998, the meeting had a different tone, when 
Malaysia had reimposed capital controls, and the US Vice President Al Gore openly de-
nounced Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir, and encouraged the Malaysians to over-
thrown him. Finally, Japan announced that it would stop making any further market-open-
ing measures at this moment and accused the US of endangering the Asia’s fragile econ-
omies by pushing the market openings to countries who were too weak to handle its 
mass. (Johnson, 2000, pp. 207-210) 
 
The US also used its influence to undermine the Asian economies collaboration. When 
the crisis started, the Japanese suggested establishing Asian Monetary Fund, so that 
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they could help the suffering countries. The US, however, blocked the idea and did not 
want anything to challenge the IMF’s and the USA’s control, especially when they knew 
that the Japanese had often disagreed with the IMF policies, and probably would not 
have insisted on similar conditions to the lending countries. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 112-113) 
 
2.4 Summary of Chapter 2 
 
The Asian financial crisis started in July 1997 when the Thai government was forced to 
depeg the baht, and led it float freely. The currency plummeted in just one night and 
affected the other East Asian countries as well. One by one they were forced to de-peg 
their currencies, which ultimately led to major downturn on stock prices and the real 
economy. As the IMF had been established to help economies with balance of payment 
problems, most of the East Asian countries turned to it for help. The IMF loaned several 
countries billions of dollars, however the loans were conditional to several policies that 
should be implemented in order to receive the loan. For instance the IMF insisted the 
governments to reduce spending, increase taxes, higher the interest rates and sell the 
indebted firms. 
 
There were several reasons behind the crisis, but one of the biggest ones was the USA’s 
insistence to quickly open up the Asian markets to foreign investors during the 1990s. 
The East Asian countries were by then called the “Asian tigers” with their rapid export-
led growth, but with the growth came the vulnerability to outside threats that the countries 
were ill-equipped for. So when investors were fleeing from the market the countries had 
little chance to protect and stabilize themselves, leading to universal crisis. 
 
3 Indonesia 
 
The following subchapters are describing briefly the political history of Indonesia from 
1945 onward and its prospects before the crisis, the evolution of the crisis and the mech-
anisms used to overcome it, followed by description of the developments after the crisis, 
the current situation and future outlooks for the country. 
 
3.1 General Suharto’s era 
 
To be able to get clear understanding of the governments politics, it is important to know 
few historical facts. Indonesia announced independence in 1945 and from then on was 
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led by President Sukarno, with support of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). How-
ever, Sukarno had problems combining the ethnically diverse nation, and several strikes 
and mass movements of workers and farmers had occurred in 1957 and 1964-1965. The 
uprisings were severely alarming and threatened the banks, companies and plantations 
owned by the Dutch, British and US. This and the USA’s anticommunist ideology during 
the Cold War-era, led to US cutting off the foreign aid to President Sukarno, while in the 
same time made some strategic alliances with the Indonesian military forces. From the 
mid-1950s the US had trained and equipped Indonesian officers and soldiers and now 
started to help Indonesia to overthrow Sukarno and supplied approximately $64 million 
to Indonesian generals for military aid. The anticommunist idea or riots were not the only 
factors making the country a desirable ally, Indonesia had also vast natural resources, 
with tactically significant sea routes from Asia to Europe. (Winters, 2011a, pp. 154-160) 
 
The President Suharto’s era started when in the night of 30th September 1965, six high 
ranking military generals were killed. The PKI claimed that the conflicts inside the military 
led to the killings, but military officials declared that the murders were designed by the 
PKI. The killings were a good excuse for the US backed General Suharto take power 
and “save” the country from communism and overthrow Sukarno. Later it has been re-
vealed that the US officials, with selected Indonesian army officials, constructed the as-
sassinations to excuse the coup and to gain power. (Winters, 2011a, pp. 154-160) 
 
Even though Suharto’s presidency did not start peacefully, and his reign has not been 
declared as the most democratic one, with strong nepotistic character, ruling with military 
power and intimidation, he did manage to make the country more united than before. 
During Suharto’s presidency Indonesia’s per capita income increased from $75 in 1966 
to almost $1200 in 1996. As well as economic growth, he also brought political stability 
to the country and Indonesia was major contributor in the creation of Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.  (Johnson, 2000, p. 79) 
 
3.2 Before the Crisis 
 
Like the other “tigers” Indonesia had experienced rapid growth in the 1980s and 1990s. 
By then Indonesia had changed from the 1960s agricultural community to manufacturing 
and service economy. Indonesia focused on food, tobacco and textiles manufacturing, 
which were also its biggest exports with oil. The reducing oil prices, however, pushed 
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the country to evolve its manufacturing sector, and it was the fastest growing sector be-
tween 1980 to 1996 (Elias & Noone, 2011). The middle class was growing and becoming 
more influential in the country and the super-rich were getting even richer (Aspinall, 
2015).  
 
During the 1990s the unemployment rate was low, around 3 to 5 percent, and GDP 
growth had been stable for years, fluctuating from 7 to 9 percent (World Bank, 2017). In 
the early 1997 Indonesia’s economic future looked promising and different businesses 
had grown with the fast expansion. Its fiscal deficits were between 1 to 2 percent of GDP 
and foreign reserves were considered to be sufficient to cover imports and short-term 
debts (Habir, 1999, pp. 197-198). 
 
3.3 The Crisis 
 
When the Thai baht collapsed in July 1997, it did not have immediate influence in Indo-
nesia, but after a few months the investors lost their confidence also in the rupiah and 
the economy began to struggle. (Habir, 1999, pp. 197-198) 
 
When the rupiah started to devalue, businesses started to face difficulties in paying back 
their loans. The banks now had vast amounts of bad debt on their hands and found 
themselves struggling as well. Foreign and domestic investors started to sell their shares 
of Indonesian companies and invested their money offshore. The government was strug-
gling to have efficient foreign reserves and as a result it decided to let the rupiah float 
freely instead of the previous managed float. In August 1997, the value of the rupiah 
started to plummet (Habir, 1999, pp. 198-199) and the rupiah devalued from 2300 to 
3000 per dollar. Also at the same time, the Indonesian companies with dollar liabilities 
started selling rupiahs and buying dollars, and equities lost almost immediately 55 per-
cent of their value (Johnson, 2000, p. 211). 
 
What made Indonesia more vulnerable was the fact that their businesses had a lot of 
debt in foreign currencies. Before the crisis, borrowing from abroad seemed a cheap 
alternative because the interest rates were often lower than in Indonesia. By then Indo-
nesia had also a very good history of handling its exchange rates at the preferred rate 
and the foreign-exchange reserves seemed sufficient to defend the rupiah against ex-
change rate fluctuations. Based on this the people assumed that this would continue in 
the future as well, thus not being well prepared for the crisis. (Habir, 1999, p. 198) 
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Unable to pay the foreign debts anymore, many companies and banks went bankrupt. 
This made the Indonesian banks seem untrustworthy and the foreign banks started to 
refuse letters of credits, which led to further difficulties for companies trying to access 
credit. Same time the diminishing exports and imports had also negative effects on the 
companies. (Habir, 1999, p. 199) 
 
The government had decided to take actions to reduce the money supply, and adjusted 
their interest rates higher, hoping that this would prevent further depreciation and attract 
foreign investors. However, this backfired, since the domestic borrowing now became 
more expensive and the companies could not afford even domestic loans. Indonesia 
then turned to the IMF for help and the first loan agreement was agreed in October 1997 
(Habir, 1999, p. 199). The $43 billion loan was a three-year policy reform program that 
included adjustments to the financial sector, tightening fiscal policy and undertaking 
structural adjustments (Emmerson, 1999, p. 323). 
 
The Indonesian government was accused that it did not commit enough to these reforms 
and was lacking any actual strategy to implement the policies. Meanwhile the country’s 
economy kept stagnating. By January 1998, the rupiah had depreciated 85 percent since 
the end of the free-floating regime. Stock markets had also reduced to half of their pre-
vious value and companies were laying off thousands of workers while inflation was in-
creasing. (Habir, 1999, p. 199) 
 
During the same month, the IMF and Indonesia made another agreement with fifty spe-
cific reforms, including breaking down monopolies and cutting government expenditure, 
so that they would be able to continue with the $43 billion funding package.  However, 
the reforms did not work and President Suharto was again accused of neglecting the 
promises made to the IMF. In April 1998, the IMF and Indonesian government confirmed 
yet another arrangement, listing 117 activities the government had to complete by spe-
cific deadline not to lose access to the aid package. Between October and April, only 7 
percent of the promised funds had been disbursed so far. (Emmerson, 1999, p. 324) 
 
The IMF had provided access to $23 billion to support the exchange rate and bailout 
creditors, but the smaller sums planned to help the poor had been less accessible. In 
order to cut back on government expenditure, the IMF ordered the food and fuel subsi-
dies to be stopped on May 4, 1998 (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 119). This resulted in a 70 percent 
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increase in fuel prices overnight. Other effects that the government deductions had, was 
that the vast amount of government projects were stopped and especially construction 
firms suffered when they suddenly lost major contracts (Winters, 2011a, pp. 174-175). 
The country was now in deep economic and political crisis and from February till April 
1998 several riots across the country erupted. Especially students rioted against the 
wealthy Chinese minority, and Suharto’s family’s businesses and buildings. During May 
over a thousand people were killed in these riots (Habir, 1999, p. 199).  Since the citizens 
were rioting against Suharto and the IMF policies, it came clear even to the US and IMF 
that Suharto needed to be replaced. There has been some evidence that the military, 
still highly influenced by the US, also took part in starting some of the riots, to replace 
President Suharto and secure its own position. Also, the US had long ago changed their 
views from the Cold War, and Suharto was no longer seen as important asset. The mili-
tary of course hoped that the wider audience would not see their involvement and the 
acts would look like concerned citizens rioting against Suharto (Johnson, 2000, pp. 80-
83). In the end, President Suharto was forced to resign on 21 May 1998, and was re-
placed by his vice president Habibie (Habir, 1999, p. 199). 
 
The financial crisis harmed several different aspects of the economy as well. At the peak 
of the financial crisis, the rupiah traded 15000 to one US dollar (Johnson, 2000, p. 211). 
In 1998 Indonesia’s GDP fell by 13,1 percent and three years after the crisis the GDP 
was still 7,5 percent lower than what it was before the crisis (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 97). 75 
percent of the firms were in distress during the crisis and almost 15 percent of working 
men in 1997 had lost their jobs by August 1998 (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 97,117). Over a thou-
sand, mostly Chinese, shopkeepers had lost their lives in the riots and in a few months 
the number of people living under the poverty line had increased from 27 million to over 
a hundred million, which was about half of the population (Johnson, 2000, pp. 74, 211-
212). 
 
Mohamad Mahathir describes the situation well in his book A New Deal for Asia when 
he quotes the former US Secretary of State Dr Henry A. Kissinger from the International 
Herald Tribune on October 1998 “In Indonesia – a rich country with vast resources and 
economy praised by the World Bank in 1997 for its efficient management – the IMF de-
manded the closing of 15 banks, the ending of monopolies on food and heating oil and 
the end of subsidies… The ending of subsidies raised fool and fuel prices, causing riots 
aimed at the Chinese minority who controls much of the economy. As a result, as much 
as $60 billion of Chinese money fled Indonesia… A currency crisis had turned into an 
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economic disaster… by April (1998) the explosion swept away the Suharto regime. A 
currency crisis, having been transmuted into an economic crisis, had become a crisis of 
political institutions. Any real economic reform stands suspended”. (Mahathir, 1999, p. 
104) 
 
In Indonesia’s case, it was easy to see that the much advertised liberalization of the 
foreign exchange markets, before the banking system was strengthened, turned out to 
be a disaster for Indonesia and instead of growth it brought instability.  (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 
54) 
 
3.3.1 IMF Reforms 
 
One of the IMF’s reform plans starting from October 1997 was to keep interest rates high 
and decrease public spending, hoping to achieve a budget surplus to one percent of 
GDP. Critics have said that these actions led to a long-term recession, instead of a just 
brief loss of confidence of the rupiah. The high interest rates made already struggling 
companies even more difficult to receive loans and government austerity measures 
caused project halts and unemployment. (Emmerson, 1999, p. 330) 
 
The IMF also insisted on closing several banks, resulting in the closure of 16 small pri-
vate banks (Emmerson, 1999, p. 330). In addition, the IMF warned that other banks might 
need to be closed down as well (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 117). During this time, the government 
did not have any deposit insurance at place (Johnson, 2000, p. 211), but trying to avoid 
the panic, the Indonesian government announced that the depositors with accounts less 
than Rp 20 million, at that time equivalent to $6500, could retrieve their money from one 
of the three state banks. These accounts were around 49 percent of all deposits. Inves-
tors with larger sums might also collect their money back after the banks’ assets had 
been sold (Emmerson, 1999, p. 330). Even though the IMF’s wish was to reassure in-
vestors that the banking sector was now adequately reformed, the markets saw this as 
a worrying sign and started to withdraw their savings from all banks (Emmerson, 1999, 
p. 330). The only banks that were not much affected were the state banks, since people 
started to deposit their money from other banks to government banks, hoping that the 
government would guarantee their savings in case of bankruptcy. Thus the private banks 
struggled even more (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 117). In addition, the larger banks now feared that 
the government would close even more banks and they stopped lending to the smaller 
banks. The private banks then started to increase their interest rates more in hope of 
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luring investors, which finally set the lending to almost a complete halt. Much later the 
IMF has admitted, that the closing of the banks had been untactful (Emmerson, 1999, p. 
330). 
 
3.3.2 Chinese Minority 
 
The wealth in Indonesia had been quite concentrated to the Chinese minority and to a 
few wealthier families, often relatives of President Suharto. Because of the riots against 
the ethnic Chinese minority, thousands of them fled from Indonesia. Even though the 
Chinese represented only 3,5 percent of the population before the crisis they represented 
close to three-quarters of the country’s wealth. The fleeing Chinese took with them ap-
proximately $85 billion in cash (Johnson, 2000, pp. 83-84) and nearly $200 billion in 
overall possessions (Winters, 2011a, p. 178). This amount of capital, of course, made 
the liquidity of the Indonesian banks even more scarce and affected their ability to pay 
back their loans (Johnson, 2000, pp. 83-84). 
 
What made matters worse, was that while the Chinese were fleeing the country, at the 
same time the Fund was injecting tens of billions of dollars to the banking sector trying 
to stabilize the situation. This gave time for the Chinese to move their assets outside of 
the country and they often even used that money to speculate against their own currency. 
(Winters, 2011a, p. 178) 
 
3.3.3 Criticism towards Indonesian Government 
 
Indonesia had been criticized, that among the reasons why it suffered so greatly from 
the financial crisis were its inadequate microeconomic policies, unsustainable invest-
ment in property, excessive foreign borrowing and unsound banks. Also, the country was 
accused of corruption and the country’s President Suharto has been accused of favoring 
his relatives and friends during his long presidency. These factors were said to influence 
the trust of the investors resulting in the financial crisis. However, these issues were 
present in Indonesia long before the financial crisis, so the disappearance of trust solely 
because of these factors seems unlikely. (Habir, 1999, p. 198) 
 
The IMF itself accused Indonesia several times during and after the crisis of “crony cap-
italism” and blamed the Asian-type economic model of not being effective, even though 
it had just months before referred to Indonesia and other East-Asian countries as miracle 
economies and Asian tigers. (Johnson, 2000, p. 80) 
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3.4 After the Crisis 
 
By November 1998 the Fund had provided nearly a billion dollars to the economy every 
month and there were some signs of recovery. Inflation had been stopped and rupiah 
had settled around 7500 per dollar, still three times weaker than in July 1997. 
(Emmerson, 1999, p. 330) 
 
After a long term under Suharto’s power the country held democratic national elections 
in 1999, with free competition among parties and policies. However, power is still quite 
concentrated to certain wealthy and authoritative families and there is no single party 
truly representing the poorest. (Winters, 2011a, pp. 179-180) 
  
By the 2000s Indonesia’s real GDP per capita was growing at a yearly 5,4 percent rate 
and poverty has decreased to around 11 percent. From then growth has been able to 
create a stronger middle class, being currently the fastest growing segment of the pop-
ulation, and around 18 percent of the population is now economically secure. (World 
Bank, 2016) 
 
Nevertheless Indonesians, and critics of the IMF, have blamed the organization for the 
country’s suffering. The IMF used tens of billions of dollars to bail out foreign lenders, 
while at the same time there was not “enough” money to support the food subsidies for 
the poorest of the people. Even after unemployment and poverty had skyrocketed the 
IMF did nothing to change its course. The Indonesians blamed the IMF for its current 
misery. The common opinion was that the IMF should be held responsible and forgive 
the debt. When the tsunami hit Indonesia in 2004, the IMF finally gave in a bit and around 
$3 billion of debt due in 2005 was postponed for a year. (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 243)  
 
3.4.1 Inequality 
 
Surprisingly, since Indonesia’s first democratic elections were held the inequality has 
increased. The politicians are mostly from the more prestigious families and the working 
class has no political party of its own. For example, even though labor unions are be-
coming more influential in Indonesia, there is no social democratic party linked to these 
unions (Aspinall, 2015). The government does not have any program, nor has it ever 
proposed a program to accomplish some wealth redistribution to the poorest citizens or 
to the whole society. Politicians often target their political promises and benefits directly 
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to their voters by introducing smaller programs benefitting only a selected target group. 
Often these are one-off deals rather than long-lasting policies (Aspinall, 2015). 
 
However, there are some indicators that redistribution is becoming more important to 
voters, and the political field is aiming to find some health care, educational and other 
social welfare policies. Especially in health care, many local governments have begun 
new social welfare policies and a new universal healthcare insurance scheme has been 
introduced nationally. The current president Joko Widodo won the election in 2014. Dur-
ing his campaign he targeted the poorer voters and promised them healthcare, education 
and other social service improvements. One of his policies is a program to give cash 
disbursements to poor families and the aim is to eventually reach one-third of the popu-
lation. (Aspinall, 2015) 
 
One factor contributing to inequality is the relatively slow growth of income for the poorest 
Indonesians, who have benefitted less from economic growth than the average (Aspinall, 
2015). There are some signs of promise as well when it comes to poverty reduction; in 
2002 18,2 percent of the population was poor and in 2015 the percentage was around 
11 percent. Nevertheless according to World Banks poverty standards, there are still 
around 40 percent of people living under 2 dollars per day (Priasto, 2015). 
 
At the same time, Indonesia’s super-rich are gathering more power and wealth around 
them. In 2010, their combined net worth was about $177 billion and the richest one hun-
dredth of one percent of Indonesia’s population, 43 000 people, has total wealth equal 
to 25 percent of the country’s GDP. The share of the extremely rich becomes more sig-
nificant when considering that in the same year only 40 Indonesians had combined 
wealth equal to 10,3 percent of GDP and 21 of those 40 individuals are billionaires 
(Winters, 2011b).  
 
The growing concentration of wealth can be seen elsewhere in the world as well, but one 
key factor to explain this trend in Indonesia was the sharp rise in prices and production 
of key commodities like coal and palm oil in the 2000s. Only the wealthy entrepreneurs 
with political connections benefitted from this boom (Aspinall, 2015). 
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3.5 Summary of Chapter 3 
 
In Indonesia the financial crisis truly exploded and it evolved to a nationwide economic 
and political chaos. Many companies went bankrupted, thousands of people lost their 
jobs, and poverty rates expanded. The IMF tried methods such as high interest rates, 
government austerity measures and closing of several banks to stabilize the economy 
with little success. The IMF accused Indonesia of poor implementation of its remedies 
and corruption, while the Indonesians blamed the IMF of poor advice and inability to 
attend the needs of the poorest citizens. 
 
Later the IMF has admitted that it failed in some of its policies, and especially closing 
down the weak banks lead to more illiquid market, almost stopping completely all lending. 
Nevertheless, the Indonesian economy gradually recovered and has been able to reach 
promising growth rates once again, while concerns about the income inequality and pov-
erty still remain.  
 
4 Malaysia 
 
Malaysia is the only country in East Asia that rejected the IMF’s help during the financial 
crisis. This makes the country an interesting comparison to others. Like in the Indonesia’s 
case, the following subchapters will also analyze the events and policies before, during 
and after the crisis. 
 
4.1 Before the Crisis 
 
Malaysia had evolved from the 1950s tin and rubber exporter to industrialized economy. 
It had more than doubled its manufacturing output between 1970s and 1990s and de-
creased its dependence on oil, palm oil and rubber exports. The government had clear 
mission to industrialize the country and concentrated on exporting electrical and elec-
tronic products (Yusoff;Hasan;& Jalil, 2000). By 1990s Malaysia had been praised glob-
ally as one of the miracle economies in East Asia. Its growth rates were high, inflation 
was only 3-4 percent per year and the unemployment rates were low (Ariff & Abubakar, 
2007). 
 
However, there were some worrying signs as well, such as Malaysia having some sub-
stantial deficit in their balance of payments in 1995, but by 1996 it was almost half of that 
and in the early 1997 it had decreased more. Also, some of Malaysia’s infrastructure and 
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development projects were considered large, but by historical comparison they were 
seen as manageable. Overall, Malaysia was considered as one of the tiger economies 
and investors were highly interested of the country.  (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 55-56) 
 
4.2 The Crisis 
 
When the Thai currency started to weaken in July 1997, Malaysia’s currency ringgit, 
started to struggle as well. The central bank of Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia, tried to 
defend the foreign exchange rate for about a week but finally was also forced to float the 
ringgit on July 14, 1997. By that time, the bank had already lost about $1,5 billion in the 
process. The ringgits value shrank almost fifty percent, falling from 2,42 to the US dollar 
in April 1997 to an all-time low 4,7 by January 1998. The financial crisis also affected the 
stock markets: between July 1997 and January 1998, approximately $225 billion in share 
values was lost. (Ariff & Abubakar, 2007) 
 
The currency collapse also led the property bubble to burst, making investors unconfi-
dent about Malaysia’s future. Money started to flow out of the country and as a result, 
the banking sector began to struggle since the number of nonperforming loans started 
to increase. By December 1997 the capital outflows had almost doubled to 4,08 percent 
from June’s pre-crisis levels of 2,18 percent. A year after the onset of crisis, in July 1998, 
the percentage was already 11,45. The high increase in nonperforming loans affected 
the banks so that they cut back on borrowing and financing. (Ariff & Abubakar, 2007) 
 
After a while the real sector also began to struggle. The stock price and ringgit depreci-
ation started to affect the domestic demand and domestic-concentrated industries, such 
as construction and services. Also, the private and foreign direct investments slowed 
down especially during 1998 because of market uncertainties. By now many of the busi-
nesses were bankrupt or downsizing and inflation and unemployment was rising. (Ariff & 
Abubakar, 2007) 
 
The IMF offered its help to Malaysia, as it had offered it to every Asian country struggling 
with the crisis. However, Malaysia refused the help. One of the reasons for the refusal 
was that the government had little faith in the IMF’s policies and other reason was that 
during the 1980s and 1990s Malaysia had grown its exports in manufacturing and oil, 
which gave it more confidence to be able to tackle the crisis on its own. In the 1970s the 
share of manufacturers in total exports was 6,5 percent, but by 1995 it was 40,5 percent 
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and at the same time the share of manufacturers in GDP rose from 1970s 13,4 percent 
to 35,7 percent by 1995 (Yusoff et al., 2000). Also, Malaysia’s government owned oil and 
gas company, Petronas, gave it more security to tackle the crisis on its own. When 
Petronas was established in the 1970s the government ensured that the major proceeds 
of the company did not fall into the arms of foreign players, and instead stayed inside the 
country (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 32-34, 143). Malaysia had also high palm oil exports, and 
even when the price volatilities of petroleum oil affected the economy, palm oil exports 
secured constant revenue to the country (Yusoff et al., 2000). 
 
Even though Malaysia had refused the IMF’s help, during the early stages of the crisis 
its approach to the downturn was very similar to the IMF’s actions in other countries. 
Malaysia’s government announced that it would cut its operating expenses by 18 percent 
and cancel or postpone several infrastructure projects. It also increased interest rates, 
trying to lure in investors looking for higher profit. To strengthen the country’s balance of 
payments account, exports were encouraged by different tax incentives, and imports 
were discouraged by increasing taxes. However, the government expenditure cuts and 
decreasing demand led to the rise of unemployment. The employment had been growing 
steadily at 4,9 and 4,6 percent in 1996 and 1997, but in 1998 it declined by 3 percent. 
Inflation also rose, reaching 6,2 percent in June 1998. The increased unemployment and 
cost of food developed a new group of poor who could not afford everyday necessities, 
education or health care. (Ariff & Abubakar, 2007) 
 
Since the high interests and low liquidity made it difficult for the domestic companies to 
gain debt and make profit, the government soon started to look for other means to boost 
the economy. Share prices had started to decrease as well, thus making loan payments 
even harder for the companies. Domestic companies were close to bankruptcy and 
cheap enough for foreign investors to acquire them at a bargain (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 
106-109). The policies currently in use were seen as short-term and ineffective so the 
government decided to change its tactics and established the National Economic Action 
Council in January 1998, whose main tasks were to develop a response plan for the 
crisis. The National Economic Recovery Plan was then introduced comprising more long-
term and unique methods, such as easing of fiscal and monetary policies and lowering 
of interest rates. The government also proposed a RM 7 billion stimulus package and a 
specialized fund aimed at key industries to gain loans at reasonable costs (Ariff & 
Abubakar, 2007).  
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In September 1998, the Malaysian government also decided to internalize its countries 
assets by returning to a fixed exchange rate regime and calling back overseas deposits 
of the ringgit. Also, it implemented new regulations to make the stockbrokers’ work more 
transparent and to avoid the effects of short selling in stock trading. Stock purchases in 
Malaysia had to be held for at least a year before they could be sold again (Mahathir, 
1999, pp. 106-109). These methods were introduced as short term, while advertising that 
the government was not opposing any long term foreign investments (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 
123). Critics however were concerned that after this mandatory one year period there 
would be massive outflow of money at one time. In response, the government revised its 
policy and introduced afterwards an exit tax with variable rates depending on the length 
of the stay and when the money was put in. The longer you kept the money after the one 
year, the less tax you needed to pay (Ariff & Abubakar, 2007). 
 
Additionally, to increase the transparency the government ordered that instead of having 
a lot of shares registered in the name of a few nominee companies, the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) now required the shares to be registered in the names of the 
beneficiary owners. This stopped the operation of illegal share markets and the stock 
prices immediately started to recover. (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 106-109) 
 
Since the ringgit was now called back and made unconvertable internationally it was 
basically valueless outside Malaysia. The offshore money, mostly removed from the 
country during 1997 and 1998 (Ariff & Abubakar, 2007), was now forced to re-enter the 
country, thereby solving the liquidity crisis. The economy started to recover quickly when 
money reserves rose and the balance of payments was in surplus. Interest rates could 
now be lowered to more reasonable levels since both the share and currency markets 
were more under control (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 109-110).  
 
Malaysia also understood the importance of effective bankruptcy laws. The government 
organized additional courts and actively took a role in restructuring the firms’ financials, 
so that companies could reorganize their assets. The methods were highly effective and 
in two years a large fraction of the distressed firms’ financials were resolved. (Stiglitz, 
2002, pp. 117-118) 
 
Even though the economy was struggling, the country’s exports increased during 1998 
due to the palm oil and manufactured goods exports. The total exports grew 29,8 percent 
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in nominal ringgit terms. However, if measured in US dollars exports declined by 2 per-
cent. Compared to other countries suffering from the crisis, this was still quite remarka-
ble, and the almost doubling of palm oil prices during that time enabled the 64,4 percent 
growth of palm oil exports. At the same time, the economic stagnation slowed down 
demand for imports, and in 1998 the imports grew only 3 percent. These factors made 
the balance of trade surplus of RM 46,7 billion possible in 1998. (Mahani, 2000) 
 
In early days of the crisis, the IMF had expressed its concerns about the Malaysian bank-
ing sector and its weaknesses. Malaysian banks had quite a high level of nonperforming 
loans – around 15 percent. However the central bank had already imposed strong regu-
lations on banks to have adequate money supplies for these losses. Also, compared to 
other East Asian countries, and especially Indonesia, Malaysia had quite strong regula-
tions towards banks and their foreign exchange lending and borrowing. They also had 
limits for the amount foreign debt companies were able to have in order to still receive 
loan from banks. (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 123) 
 
4.3 After the Crisis 
 
After the financial crisis, Malaysia has had more steady GDP growth than before. Malay-
sia was able to stop the GDP decline quite early and had positive growth already in 1999.  
Recently it has been growing at approximately 5,2 percent per annum. The inflation is 
now in low levels, being 2,1 percent in 2015, and the unemployment level has stayed 
low. (World Bank, 2017) 
 
Even though the country seems to be operating quite well and is relatively high in the 
world’s competitiveness score, some concerns remain. The ringgit is currently trading at 
its lowest levels since the crisis and related to this in October 2015 Malaysia’s parliament 
member Wong Chen stated his concern about the economic future of Malaysia: "The 
biggest worrying factor is the domestic confidence level has plummeted due to the goods 
and services tax (GST) and also due to the fact that politically it's not very stable," The 
consumer confidence level had dropped to an all time low since 2005, when the first 
market survey about consumer confidence were conducted. The government introduced 
the new GST of 6 percent in April 2015, to gather some revenue, but consumers have 
reduced their spending because of the higher prices. At the same time, consumers have 
a high level of personal debt. Household debt is around 88 percent of GDP, and Wong 
fears that the tax increases may result in payment problems for those loans. "Even 
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though there's no default, what it requires is constant wage growth, and it needs a grow-
ing economy and that's not happening." However, Wong does emphasize that the Ma-
laysian banking sector is doing remarkably better than during the crisis, and it is not 
burdened by the debt. Wong is also worried about the expected increase in the US Fed-
eral Reserve’s interest rate which has led to an outflow of money. He is also concerned 
about the price drops of its major commodity exports, crude and palm oil, severely af-
fecting the country’s outlook. (Shaffer, 2015) 
 
The government, however, sees the future brighter. The economy is growing more 
slowly, but it is still growing at decent pace. Also in October 2015, Minister for Interna-
tional trade and industry, Mustapa Mohamed, said that oil with other commodities ac-
counts for just over 20 percent of exports, while manufacturing accounted for 50 percent 
and that the market has overreacted to the reduction of the oil prices. The country’s trade 
balance looks healthy and the government’s budget is on track. (Shaffer, 2015) 
 
One of the key factors to help Malaysia’s future outlooks in growth and stability is its 
efficiency as a steel and plastics producer. In addition, investments in the high-tech sec-
tor has helped it to become one of the major producers in computers, computer chips 
and electronic industries. Even though Malaysia has invited foreign investment, it has 
made sure that the firms have transferred technology and trained local workers so that 
the country would gain from these investments. One good example is the government 
owned oil and gas company Petronas, where foreign investors were prevented from ex-
ploiting Malaysia’s natural resources, but instead helped to teach the Malaysians and 
develop the industry, while ensuring that most of the value of the resources stayed in 
Malaysia. Today Petronas is a major oil and gas company and it is also helping other 
developing countries by teaching them to develop in the industry.  (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 32-
34) 
 
4.4 Summary of Chapter 4 
 
Malaysia was the only country in Asia who refused the IMF’s help and decided to over-
come the crisis on its own. As described above Malaysia’s approach to stabilize the 
economy was very different than IMF’s. Instead of increasing the interest rates, Malaysia 
lowered them. Instead of cutting back on government expenditure, it increased funding 
to specific important industries and used funds to stimulate the economy. It also in-
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creased regulations to financial sector and called back its currency from offshore, in-
creasing the liquidity in the country. It also helped firms to deal with bankruptcies in an 
effective way and regulated foreign investments, and at the same time repegged its cur-
rency back to the dollar, making the exchange rate more stable. All these methods 
helped the country to revive already in 1999 and diminish the damages of the crisis. The 
country has since then once again de-pegged its currency and has been able to increase 
its GDP while keeping its inflation, unemployment and poverty rates down. 
 
5 Comparison 
 
The previous chapters have discussed the situation in Asia in general and, more specif-
ically, the two countries, Indonesia and Malaysia. To be able to compare the countries 
better, the thesis focuses on eight different economic parameters, which are GDP, ex-
change rate, inflation, foreign direct investment, competitiveness, unemployment, pov-
erty and inequality. The aim is to conclude the differences in their recovery speed, sta-
bility and growth to help understand and compare the countries. 
 
5.1 GDP and Growth 
 
Before the crisis, Indonesia had quite stable GDP growth rates in the 1990s, fluctuating 
from 7,2 to 9 percent. The crisis can be seen in 1997s rates already, when growth was 
only 4 percent. However, the crisis really hit in 1998 when Indonesia’s GDP fell by 13,1 
percent. Since then GDP has gradually grown, first 0,8 percent in 1999 and 4,9 percent 
in 2000, but it still has not achieved the pre-crisis levels of over 7 percent growth. From 
1999 to 2015 the average GDP growth rate has been 5,0 percent. (World Bank, 2017) 
 
In Malaysia, GDP growth levels before the crisis were fluctuating between 8,8 and 10 
percent. In 1997, the growth rate was still 7 percent, however in 1998 it declined by 7,4 
percent. During 1999 and 2000 it grew by 6,1 and 8,9 percent. Since then the growth 
has been fluctuating more, but it is on average 5,2 percent per year (1999-2015). (World 
Bank, 2017) 
 
When comparing the GDP growth, also represented in the Figure 1, it is easy to see that 
Malaysia seemed to recover more quickly from the crisis, since its GDP started to rise 
steeply already in 1999. However, in the long run the evidence is not so clear, since the 
countries growth rates are very similar and Malaysia has had more fluctuations in its 
GDP. 
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Figure 1: Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s annual GDP growth in percentages. Source: World Bank, 
2017  
 
5.2 Exchange rate 
 
In Indonesia, the rupiah started to plummet in August 1997 and by January 1998 it had 
depreciated 85 percent from its summer rates (Habir, 1999, p. 199). The rupiah devalued 
from 2300 per dollar to an all time low of 16600 by June 1998. The rupiah gradually 
recovered, but it has recently devalued near to the crisis levels of 13000-14000 per dollar 
(Trading Economics, 2017). 
 
Figure 2: The Indonesian rupiahs and Malaysian ringgits exchange rates from 1990-2017. Rupi-
ahs exchange rate on the left and Malaysia’s rate on the right. Source: Trading Economics, 
2017 
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The Malaysian ringgits value shrank almost 50 percent in less than a year, starting from 
April 1997 at 2,4 per dollar, reaching to the all-time low of 4,7 in January 1998 (Ariff & 
Abubakar, 2007). From January onwards the exchange rate settled somewhat, and in 
October 1998 the government pegged the currency at a fixed rate of 3,8 per dollar, mak-
ing the rate unsuitable for comparison. In 2005, the currency was allowed to float freely 
again, and the rate slightly dropped until 2013 when it started to rise again. The ringgit 
is currently trading at around 4,4 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2017). 
 
The exchange rates’ shifts can also be seen in Figure 2, where ringgits’ and rupiahs’ 
rates are expressed in the same graph. From the figure the comparison is easy to see, 
and the ringgits peg is very noticeable. Because of the peg, the currencies cannot really 
be compared immediately after the financial crisis, but in the last decade the differences 
are more noticeable. However, currently the rupiah and ringgit are both changing at very 
low rates, close to the numbers during the crisis. Especially the ringgits exchange rate 
has dropped quickly in a few years. 
 
5.3 Inflation and Consumer Prices 
 
The countries consumer price inflations are represented in Figure 3. There you can see 
that Indonesia’s consumer price inflation had been on average about 8,5 percent per 
year. In 1996 and 1997 the inflation was still at a reasonable level at 8,0 and 6,2 percent 
respectively, but in 1998 inflation really boomed to 58 percent (World Bank, 2017). By 
November that year, inflation started to settle and by then the rupiah was exchanging at 
7500 per dollar, three times weaker than in summer 1997 (Emmerson, 1999, p. 330). 
Also noticeable, in 1998, was that when the government reduced the subsidies, the price 
of fuel increased 70 percent over one night (Winters, 2011a, pp. 174-175). In 1999, in-
flation started to lower and was 20 percent, and in 2000 it was already around 3,7 per-
cent. During the 2000s inflation has been fluctuating between 3,7 to 13,1 percent, aver-
aging around 7 percent per year. In 2015, the inflation rate was 6,4 percent (World Bank, 
2017). 
 
In Malaysia, inflation on consumer prices had been around 3 to 4 percent per year before 
the crisis. In 1998 inflation rose to over 5 percent (World Bank, 2017) and during the 
same year inflation was at its highest in 6,2 percent in June 1998 (Ariff & Abubakar, 
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2007). In 1999 inflation came back to a more reasonable 2,7 percent and has been rang-
ing from 0,6 – 3,6 percent per year, except for 2008 when inflation once again rose over 
5 percent. In 2015 the inflation rate was 2,1 percent (World Bank, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 3: Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s inflation in consumer prices in percentages 1990-2015. 
Source: World Bank 2017 
 
Malaysia’s inflation stabilized more quickly after the financial crisis and was already at 
pre-crisis levels in 1999, and has been at quite stable levels since, and even a little lower 
than before the crisis. Indonesia’s recovery to pre-crisis levels took one year longer and 
its inflation has been fluctuating a lot. In 2009 its inflation seemed to stabilize and has 
been around 4-6 percent since. 
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5.4 Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Since the IMF had encouraged both countries to open their economies to foreign invest-
ment, foreign direct investment (FDI) is an interesting indicator to follow. Both countries 
FDI’s are illustrated in the Figure 4. Malaysia has had somewhat steadier growth in its 
investments than Indonesia.  
 
 
Figure 4: Foreign direct investment in Malaysia and Indonesia, net inflows (BoP, current US$). 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
 
Especially Indonesia had significant increase of investments a few years before the cri-
sis, growing to around 6,2 billion US dollars in 1996. The financial crisis has clearly de-
creased the amount of foreign investments even to negative, meaning there were more 
capital outflows than inflows. By 2000 foreign investments had dropped to -4,55 billion 
US dollars. Since then, there has been quite rapid growth and especially between 2009 
and 2014 the growth rates have been fast, peaking at $25 billion in 2014. In 2015 growth 
steadied and FDI of the country was around $20 billion. (World Bank, 2017) 
 
In Malaysia, foreign investment fluctuations have been more moderate. The crisis is still 
seen with a drop in 1998, changing from 1997 $5,1 billion to $2,2 billion. However, in the 
next year the FDI was up again at $3,9 billion (World Bank, 2017). Nevertheless, there 
is a bigger drop in the net inflows again in 2001. The Central Bank of Malaysia explains 
this as due to a slowdown in the global economy and with a one huge private sector 
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acquisition by a Malaysian company financed with long-term debt securities (Bank 
Negara Malaysia, 2002). Since then inward FDI has been growing, except in year 2009 
with the global financial crisis, following with higher peaks in 2010 and 2011. Currently 
FDI seems to be more stabilized and has been around 10-11 billion US dollars in recent 
years (World Bank, 2017). 
 
When comparing the two countries, it is clear that Indonesia has been able to lure more 
foreign investment in the recent decade at least. However, the fluctuations also seem to 
be bigger, indicating that FDI growth might not be as stable as in Malaysia. Malaysia’s 
government had also a more strict approach to the crisis and controlled the capital flows 
more, which has led to more stable outcome, eliminating the high peaks as well as the 
downturns. 
 
5.5 Competitiveness 
 
One simple way to compare the countries is to examine its competitiveness placement 
in the World Competitiveness Yearbook. It is an annual report published by the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development (IMD), which compares countries by meas-
uring different aspects of competitiveness, through statistical economic indicators as well 
as surveys. (IMD, 2017) 
 
In Figure 5, the World competitiveness rankings are presented. Malaysia is currently in 
19th place and Indonesia 48th. The performances of the countries in 1997 were ranked 
as Malaysia 14th and Indonesia 38th. In 1998 the rankings had dropped, Malaysia being 
19th and Indonesia 40th. 2000 and 2002 Malaysia’s ranking was 27 and 26, but by 2004 
it had climbed back to 16th place. During more recent years, its rating has been fluctuating 
around 15th. Indonesia had been constantly descending the whole early 2000’s, being 
60th by 2006. However, it has recently experienced more growth and has climbed back 
up to 48th. (IMD, 2017) 
 
Even though the competitiveness gives some indication of the countries’ current status, 
it is good to recognize that the performance of other countries highly influences the ranks. 
Even if the country in question would not have made any changes its placement can still 
drop because other countries have outperformed it. Nevertheless, it seemed like Malay-
sia was able to improve its ranking more quickly after the financial crisis, while Indonesia 
was still struggling in 2006. Currently Malaysia is five places behind its 1997 rating and 
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Indonesia ten places, but if comparing the 2015 numbers Malaysia was at the same 
ranking than before financial crisis, while Indonesia was only four places behind its pre-
crisis level. (IMD, 2017)  
 
  
Figure 5: World Competitiveness Scoreboard 2016 and 2015. 2015 numbers are on the brackets. 
Source: World Bank, 2016 
 
5.6 Unemployment 
 
In Indonesia, the unemployment rate had been fluctuating somewhere around 3-5 per-
cent of the total workforce in the 1990s. In 1998 the rate was 5,5 percent and continued 
to grow as high as 11,2 percent by 2005 (World Bank, 2017). Especially noticeable is 
that almost 15 percent of working men in 1997 had lost their jobs by August 1998 and 
male unemployment grew ten times bigger (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 97). Since then unemploy-
ment has gradually decreased and was around 6 percent in 2014 (World Bank, 2017). 
 
In Malaysia, the unemployment rate had been steadily decreasing before the crisis, and 
in 1996 and 1997 it was 2,5 and 2,4 percent respectively. The increase of unemployment 
was not as high as in Indonesia, increasing to over 3 percent. The unemployment rate 
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has been close to three percent during the 2000s, closing in at 2,9 percent in 2014. 
(World Bank, 2017) 
 
When comparing Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s unemployment numbers, it is quite obvious 
that Malaysia’s unemployment was not heavily influenced by the crisis compared to In-
donesia, especially in the long-term. The gap between the highest rate in 2005 (11,2 
percent) and the 1996 number is 6,8 percent. However, in Malaysia the same gap is only 
1,2 percent, comparing the highest unemployment rate after the crisis (2009; 3,7 percent) 
to the 1996 numbers (World Bank, 2017). Indicating that Malaysia succeeded on limiting 
the effects of the crisis to the unemployment, while Indonesia struggled in this area. 
 
5.7 Poverty 
 
When looking at Indonesia’s poverty rates, it is vital to know that the country altered a bit 
the way of counting poverty in 1996, by growing the line of poverty little. Even though 
this did not hugely impact on the numbers, the previous to 1996 numbers might be 
slightly smaller than what they would have been if calculated by the new standards. Now-
adays Indonesia’s national poverty line is set at consumption outlays of Rp 302,735 ($25) 
per month per person, around 82 cents a day (Priasto, 2015). When looking at Indone-
sia’s official statistics, according to these standards, before the crisis, in the 1990s, the 
poverty had been fluctuating somewhere between 11,3-17,5 percent. And according to 
the new standard in 1996 it was 17,5 percent. During the crisis, the poverty peaked to 
as high as 24,2 percent in 1998. In 1999, poverty started to decrease slightly to 23,4 
percent and has been shrinking since, reducing to pre-crisis levels 17,4 percent by 2003 
and being around 11 percent in 2015 (BPS - Statistics Indonesia, 2017). However, if a 
World Bank poverty indicator would be used, meaning people living with less than $2 a 
day, then still 40 percent of the population would still be considered as poor (Priasto, 
2015). When calculating with this method, the number of people living under the poverty 
line during the crisis reached close to 50 percent – over one hundred million people 
(Johnson, 2000, pp. 74, 211-212). Many Indonesians are also living near the poverty line 
and can be easily fluctuating in and out of poverty. A good indicator of this is that 55 
percent of households classified as poor in 2014 were not poor a year earlier (Priasto, 
2015). 
 
In Malaysia, poverty had been steadily reducing during the 1990s before the crisis, from 
16,5 percent in 1990 to 6,1 by 1997. After that the financial crisis affected the poverty 
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rates and by 1999 7,5 percent of the population was living under the poverty line 
(Economic Planning Unit, 2017). Thereafter poverty started reducing again and was un-
der the pre-crisis levels at 5,5 by 2000 (Abhayaratne, 2004). The 2014 numbers indicate 
that poverty is diminishing and only 0,6 percent are currently living in poverty (Economic 
Planning Unit, 2017). 
 
The poverty ratios are difficult to compare, since Indonesia’s poverty rates were much 
higher in the first place. However, it seems like Malaysia has been able to reduce poverty 
close to a minimum and Indonesia is still struggling to reduce its poverty. Even when 
looking at Indonesia’s national poverty standards, they returned to pre-crisis levels in 
2003, 3 years after Malaysia. Malaysia recovered relatively quickly by being already at 
lower levels than before the crisis by 2000. 
 
5.8 Inequality and Gini coefficient 
 
The Gini coefficient is a widely-used measure of inequality. Countries are given points, 
where 0 represents complete equality and 100 (or 1) represents complete inequality. 
Usually the Gini coefficient is measured with consumption, but in Malaysia it is counted 
with income (World Bank, 2016). This makes the comparison a little bit trickier, but since 
inequality in Indonesia is a widely acknowledged concern, it remains an important topic 
to include in this thesis. 
 
Figure 6: The Gini coefficients in East Asia. 1990s (dark) and 2000s (light). Consumption Ginis 
for all countries except Malaysia, which uses income. The periods for countries are: Indonesia 
1990-2011; Malaysia 1992-2009, Source: World Bank, 2016 
 
Figure 6 presents the Gini ratios of East Asian countries. The Malaysian Gini is not so 
comparable in this graph, since the calculation method is different. However it does give 
indication that Malaysia’s Gini has not changed as much as Indonesia’s during the 1990s 
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and 2000s and unlike Indonesia Malaysia’s Gini has reduced during the years. Indone-
sia’s inequality on the other hand seems to have increased quite a lot during recent dec-
ades, increasing around 10 points. (World Bank, 2016) 
 
Looking closer at Indonesia’s Gini ratios, which are also displayed in Figure 7, it is no-
ticeable that during the 1980s inequality was somewhat stable, but by the 1990s bigger 
fluctuations in the ratio can be seen. The Asian financial crisis then again lowered the 
ratio, since the richest, who had more to lose in the crisis, where hit hardest and also 
recovered relatively slowly from the crisis, making the Gini ratio decrease to 30 by 2000. 
Nevertheless, from year 2000 onward, the gap between the poor and rich started to 
widen again to 37 by the next financial crisis. However, the global financial crisis did not 
affect Indonesia so much and it was able to sustain growth, keeping the Gini higher as 
well: by 2011 it had reached 41, where it has been steady since. (World Bank, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 7: Gini coefficient (points) of Indonesia and poverty rate (percent) 1980-2014. Note: The 
national poverty line was changed in 1998, and the 1996 rate is calculated under both the new 
and old methodologies. Source: World Bank, 2016 
 
In Malaysia, inequality has been dropping rapidly especially during the past decade. The 
effect of the financial crisis can also be seen in Figure 8, when inequality has dropped 
remarkably. After the crisis, the Gini started to rise again, and was at its peak of around 
46 points in 2004. Since then the Gini has reduced substantially, and 2014 it was around 
40 points, reducing 6 points in ten years. (Economic Planning Unit, 2017) 
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Figure 8: Gini coefficient of Malaysia, 1989-2014. Source: Economic Planning Unit, 2017 
 
The countries’ Gini ratios explain how differently the countries have reacted to growth. 
Previously explained GDP growth numbers were quite similar for both, thus the Gini’s 
suggest that while Malaysia has been able to spread its growth better to the whole nation, 
in Indonesia the wealth is more concentrated in fewer hands. 
 
5.9 Summary of Chapter 5 
 
When comparing Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s different indicators, it seems that in finan-
cial and economic parameters the countries are currently quite alike, even though Indo-
nesia might have taken longer to overcome the crisis. But when comparing the social 
factors Malaysia has been able to improve its citizen’s well-being and distribute the coun-
try’s wealth better.  
 
Malaysia recovered quicker when comparing in GDP, inflation and competitiveness rank-
ing, nevertheless, Indonesia has recently outperformed Malaysia in FDI growth and cur-
rently the countries have very similar GDP growth rates and exchange rates. Exchange 
rates are difficult to compare immediately after the crisis, because of the rupiahs peg, 
but after the 2005 de-peg the rupiahs value has reduced quicker. Malaysia’s unemploy-
ment rate was not as much influenced by the crisis than Indonesia’s and Malaysia has 
been able to reduce poverty close to minimum while Indonesia is still struggling quite a 
bit to distribute the nation’s wealth to the poorest as well. This can also be seen at the 
inequality ratio, which has been steadily reducing in Malaysia, while at the same time it 
is growing in Indonesia. 
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6 IMF Critique 
 
The IMF has received a lot of criticism with its way of handling crises, not just with Asian 
financial crisis, but with other financial crises as well. There are several factors that es-
pecially influenced the East Asian countries, such as the lack of accountability and trans-
parency in the IMF, the huge number of conditions to be able to receive the loan and the 
amount of influence the US has through the IMF. The largest targets of criticism are 
introduced in this chapter and the impact these factors has had to Asia and other lending 
countries. 
 
6.1 Opening up the Markets 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s the IMF and the US Treasury had pushed the Asian coun-
tries toward capital account liberalization, arguing it would help the region grow faster, 
even though most of the countries in East Asia had no specific need for additional capital, 
since their savings rates were quite high. The fast liberalization of capital markets made 
the countries more vulnerable to outside threats and market fluctuations. However, the 
IMF continued to argue that the liberalization and market forces would make the market 
work more efficiently and this would enable more growth. Other argument towards the 
globalization policy was that instead bringing vulnerability to the market, the markets 
could actually be less risky since investments could be distributed wider. Nevertheless, 
the assumption was proven void in Asia when the opening up led to massive capital 
outflows and several countries on the verge of bankruptcy.  With the 2008 global financial 
crisis fresh in mind, it is easy to understand how the globalization brought instability to 
several countries, as the economic changes in one region easily affects the whole global 
economy. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 90-101) 
 
The Asian countries repeatedly got criticisms especially from the US for being too closed 
and that the state is intervening too much, not allowing free markets to function properly. 
Even after the crisis already started, in September 1997, in the annual meeting of IMF 
and World Bank, the IMF officials advised, and pressured, the Asian countries to liberal-
ize their capital markets. Even though most of the countries’ officials were concerned 
that the foreign investors and hot money could deepen the problem, they were afraid to 
resist in fear that the IMF would withdraw its funding if they did so. Malaysia was the only 
country that refused the IMF’s help and acted differently (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 92-93). In-
stead of liberalization it tightened its control over the capital market and the government 
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took active role to regulate the financial sector (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 106-110). Indonesia, 
on the other hand, unable to re-impose capital control methods, lost several billions of 
dollars when investors hustled their capital offshore (Johnson, 2000, pp. 83-84). 
 
In addition, the market liberalization made companies vulnerable to outside bargain-
hunters. During the crisis, many companies struggled to pay the high interest rates and 
the liberalizations gave the opportunity to foreign companies to buy these firms at a bar-
gain. The IMF even promoted it by saying that the firms needed knowledge and reforms 
from the foreign managers to be able to gain stable growth again. The struggling com-
panies were usually bought by foreigners, often even financed by the same foreign banks 
that had denied loans for the domestic players. However, the foreigners did not neces-
sarily even make any grand adjustments and just waited till the economy started to re-
cover and then sold the assets at a higher price (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 129-130). Many 
Asians call this “vulture capitalism” and suspect that the IMF gave them deliberately 
faulty advice, so that the major American companies could buy their assets at bargain 
prices. Countries like Indonesia have been long dependent and highly influenced by the 
US, so when the pressure from the US side to globalize their nations began, it was quite 
impossible for them to say no. In the end, the companies and assets, built with their own 
labor were now taken by the same government which forced them to open up their mar-
kets (Johnson, 2000, pp. 226-227).  
 
The US policy to boost countries to open up their markets, weakened the East Asian 
countries’ power and the US seemed to be happy to reinsure itself against any compet-
itors. The US also led a campaign against Asian style economies and advertised that the 
US style capitalism, with little government intervention is the one and best policy in the 
world. However, since the opening of the markets had severe consequences the US lost 
some credibility and in the same context betrayed its Cold War supporters. The other 
countries had also seen how Malaysia tackled the crisis quicker and with less conse-
quences than other countries. This gave the US style capitalism even less creditability, 
since government control and intervention was key factors to overcome the crisis. 
(Johnson, 2000, pp. 213-214) 
 
The IMF has conceded later that the rapid capital market liberalization was indeed harm-
ful and dangerous to the Asian economies (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 90), and in 2003 they 
acknowledged that for many developing countries the capital market liberalization had 
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not led to more growth, just more instability. The Washington consensus type of globali-
zation idea is based on a theory that assumes perfect information, perfect competition 
and perfect risk markets. This is an ideology that does not meet reality, especially when 
talking about developing countries (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 16, 28). 
 
6.2 The US Influence 
 
One of the reasons behind the IMF’s rigid policies is argued to be the structure of the 
organization and its voting system. Rich countries dominate decision-making in the IMF, 
because the amount of money a country pays into the IMF’s reserves determines the 
volume of their voting rights (Ker, 2002). This gives minor authority to the poorer coun-
tries and the political power is in the hands of the biggest shareholders, such as the US 
with 16,5 percent of votes, followed by China, Japan, Germany, France and Great Britain 
(IMF, 2017). The voting rights have also been distributed when the IMF was established, 
and only slight changes have been made since, with the US being the only country with 
a veto power (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 12-13). The interests of the lower income countries are 
often diminished and the interests of bankers, investors and corporations from the more 
developed countries are put above the needs of the world's poor majority, especially 
when US-based internationally operating firms are considered (Ker, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, during the Cold War, the US had keen interactions with East Asian coun-
tries and it wanted to “protect” the countries from communism as well as advertised the 
benefits of opening up their markets, especially to export consumer goods to the US 
market. During the time many US manufacturers outsourced their facilities to Asia. The 
Asian countries of course welcomed the revenue gathered from exports and expected it 
to continue, and it did so as long the Cold War continued. However, over time this pro-
duced overinvestments and excess capacity in East Asia and large trade deficits for the 
US. The East Asian economies were now built solely to export sales, instead of domestic 
demand. When the exports were mainly concentrated on the US market, the countries 
came highly dependent on the US. This worked so long as the US economy remained 
massively larger than the East-Asian economies, but in the end, there were too many 
factories manufacturing too many goods to too few people. (Johnson, 2000, pp. 193-
197) 
 
The fast growing Asia was also becoming a substantial competitor to the western world 
and especially to the US. So, the US and IMF offering help to Asia was not seen as an 
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entirely unselfish act. On the contrary, the IMF has been said to have used the Asian 
crisis to advance its own strategic interests and forcing Asia into submission, to make 
the threat more controllable (Mahathir, 1999, p. 60). The fact that the US blocked Japan’s 
offer to the help the Asian countries in need supports this fact. In November 1997 Japan 
and Taiwan offered $100 billion to help create an Asian Monetary Fund, so that they 
could assist the countries in need and stimulate their economies, but the US Treasury 
and the IMF rejected the idea (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 112-113). Since the IMF had a monop-
oly in this type of “market” it did not appreciate the competition. The US also having the 
only veto power in the IMF could not risk losing some of its power by having a competitor 
(Johnson, 2000, p. 211). The US was afraid that Japan and possibly China would chal-
lenge the Americans with their own fund and this would disperse the control, especially 
since the Japanese had often disagreed with the IMF’s policies and would not have de-
manded such harsh conditions as the IMF. The help was thus rejected and the idea was 
killed. However, eventually the Japanese did help by donating $30 billion under the 
Miyazawa Initiative and three years after the crisis the East Asian countries did create 
the Chang Mai Initiative, a more modest version of the Asian Monetary Fund (Stiglitz, 
2002, pp. 112-113). In addition, China also offered Indonesia its help, in the form of cash 
and medical supplies, as well as the opportunity not to devalue the renminbi, so it would 
not compete with Indonesia’s exports. However, Indonesia, already receiving aid from 
IMF had to turn down the help (Johnson, 2000, p. 84). 
 
6.3 Closing the Weak Banks 
 
The IMF focused on shutting down weak banks in Asia and in Indonesia. Even though 
the banks had made some risky investments, closing down the banks made companies’ 
access to credit even more difficult. The IMF urged the banks to either shut down or 
quickly adjust their capital adequacy ratio to better levels. The capital adequacy ratio 
means that the banks are required to have certain amounts of capital in reserve com-
pared to their outstanding loans. During a recession, the banks might have more non-
performing loans, so they would fail to meet this ratio. To correct the ratio the banks can 
either increase capital reserves or reduce the loans. When banks now needed to quickly 
correct the ratio, they started to call back the loans. But as each bank starts to do this, 
the firms have more difficulty accessing capital and credit and they start to cut back on 
their production and other expenses, in the end affecting other firms and their employees 
as well. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 116-117)  
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The shutting down of 16 weak banks in Indonesia almost completely stopped the lending 
between the banks and to companies. The trust to Indonesian financial sector nearly 
disappeared and investors started to withdraw their money out of the country even faster. 
This made the private banks to increase their interests more to lure in investors and soon 
practically no one was able to receive or ask for credit. (Emmerson, 1999, p. 330) 
 
The IMF later admitted that the closing down of the banks was not tactful, and perhaps 
they had learnt something from the error or simply did not want to use the same methods 
themselves, since the advice given to the Asian countries was completely different from 
the approach the US took during the 2008 global financial crisis. During the 2008 crisis 
the US banks had also lend too much money compared what they had on their reserves. 
In 2007, when the signs of the crisis were already in the air, the central government 
provided liquidity to the banks and the US central bank, Federal Reserve System (Fed), 
started to decrease the interest rates. The US government bailed-out several banks and 
bought huge number of nonperforming loans from the banks as well as gave them cash 
funds to encourage lending, so that the markets would resume liquidity. (The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011) 
 
6.4 Bankruptcies 
 
One of the problems was that when businesses went to bankrupt, there was a long period 
of time before the real owners of the firm could be announced. The businesses were in 
a limbo-like state, when the old owners had filed for bankruptcy they did not own the 
firms anymore but the creditors were not clearly aligned either so there could be long 
periods of time when the company and its remaining assets did not belong to anyone. 
Many Asian countries did not have the legal framework to address efficiently the bank-
ruptcy issue and this gave the opportunity to the old owners or managers to exploit the 
situation and embezzle the remained assets. In Malaysia, the government actively took 
a role in restructuring the firms’ financials, and in two years a large fraction of the dis-
tressed companies’ financials were resolved. The IMF however did not see the role of a 
government to be important in financial restructuring and completely neglected this part 
of the crisis in Indonesia, and many other countries. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 117-118)  
 
The IMF’s agenda not to involve the government to the bankruptcies is once again 
seen as an odd approach, when considering the active role the US government took 
during the global financial crisis in US. The Fed actively helped several bankrupted 
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companies and even purchased part of them or helped banks or other companies to 
acquire them. The Fed was also willing to provide overnight cash loans or US Treasury 
bills for companies with collateral, so that companies would be still able to receive 
loans. As housing bubble was one of the key issues during the crisis, the government 
encouraged banks to adjust interest rates of the mortgages, spread loan payments 
over longer period of time or simply write down the mortgage debts. All in all, the US 
government had over 20 emergency programs and used trillions of dollars to stabilize 
the financial system and rescue specific firms. (The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 2011) 
 
6.5 Bailing out Lenders 
 
Critics argue that the bailout packages really do not help the country in question, but 
instead help the lenders. The IMF’s plan was to quickly refinance the reserves so that 
international creditors could be reimbursed. IMF programs also might influence the lend-
ers’ behavior. When crises have occurred, the IMF has loaned money to the countries 
via bailout packages, but the money is not used to boost the countries’ economies or 
increase social welfare, it is often used to bailout the Western banks. It provides money 
to the government so that they can pay back to their foreign creditors, thus reducing the 
nonpayment risk for the lender, and while doing so incentivizing the lenders to take 
higher risks. The lenders are then bailed out, without having to bear the consequences 
of their poor investment, and the country, with its taxpayers, are left with the bill to pay 
back the loan to the IMF. Even worse, if the lenders assume that the bailout is likely to 
happen, they might lend even more knowing that their investment will be rescued. 
(Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 35, 217) 
 
Nonetheless, if considered from the lender banks perspective, those policies worked 
quite well in Asia and most of the countries restored their reserves relatively quickly and 
paid back the IMF loans in a few years. (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 35, 217) Unfortunately, Indo-
nesia was not one of the lucky countries who were able to pay back the loan in a few 
years. Nevertheless, it did manage to pay back the loan ten years after the crisis in 2006, 
four years before the scheduled repayment time (IMF, 2006). The amount that the Indo-
nesia taxpayers suffered from the loan is difficult to interpret, but most noticeable factor 
are the government expenditure cuts that the country had to make to be able to pay back 
the loan, which clearly ultimately affected the unemployment rate and poverty. The IMF 
also hoped to achieve budget surplus by keeping the interest rates high, and as said 
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before, this resulted to an inability for companies to pay back the loans, decrease in all 
loan activities and ultimately led to a banking crisis (Emmerson, 1999, p. 330). Malaysia 
on the other hand tried to revive the whole economy, and keep the markets liquid so that 
no bailouts would be necessary, while in the same time regulated its banking sector. The 
government helped bankrupted companies to disburse their remaining assets relatively 
quickly, enabling the lenders to receive their share of the remaining assets and thus 
making the economic atmosphere more stable. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 117-118) 
 
6.6 Lack of Country Specific Reforms 
 
The IMF is also blamed for its lack of responsiveness to making country specific reforms. 
The format to all countries seeking funding is usually the same; high interest rates, bal-
anced budgets and adjustments of current external payments. These measures do not 
recognize the countries’ cultures and economic differences. The countries might be 
forced to open up the markets and national control is completely lost. This has led to 
bankruptcies and suffering of the domestic companies, and might have caused the re-
covery to take more time than necessary. The IMF has considered the theory and 
method more important than the actual results of those theories. Especially before the 
crisis it had promoted the openness of economies to all the East Asian countries, thereby 
making the developing countries more vulnerable to outside threats. Later the IMF itself 
admitted making some mistakes with the East Asian countries, leaving them unneces-
sarily vulnerable to foreign threats. (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 100-102) 
 
The IMF also used the same methods as it had used in Latin America, even though the 
situation was completely different. In Latin America, the governments had loose mone-
tary policies and government spending was high, which led to huge deficits and high 
inflation. In Asia, the governments had surpluses and inflation was low. It was the com-
panies that were suffering from high debts. So, the economies would have needed stim-
ulation, instead the IMF insisted on austerity measures and when they raised interest 
rates the companies suffered, unable to pay their debts, leaving the whole economy 
staggering. The difference between Malaysia and Indonesia regarding this matter is easy 
to see. Malaysian government actively made efforts to stimulate the whole economy and 
recovered relatively quick, while Indonesia was in deeper recession and struggled 
longer. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 104-105) 
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6.7 Accountability and Transparency 
 
One major concern for the IMF is that even though it is funded with taxpayer money, it is 
not held accountable for its actions to anyone. It is also criticized for not allowing the 
participation of members of the affected government in the decision-making process. 
The loan agreements and the policies implemented usually consist of the same political 
principles and they are not altered to every country’s specific needs. The IMF works with 
a group of bankers and finance ministers with set policies, dictating the terms of the loans 
without consulting the countries’ agencies, such as health, education and environment 
departments. Since the countries are in huge need of outside financing they have no 
reasonable pressure to affect those decisions. (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 220-228) 
 
The IMF has been focused on economic policies and inflation, rather than wages, unem-
ployment or poverty, since those areas are closer to the World Bank’s mandate. How-
ever, without looking at the economy as a whole, their policies have often led to more 
unemployment and poverty, as they did in Indonesia. Nevertheless, in recent decades 
they have at least officially announced that poverty reduction is also one of their priorities 
(Stiglitz, 2006, p. 14). Malaysia on the other hand concentrated on aiding important in-
dustries and used funds to reduce unemployment (Ariff & Abubakar, 2007). 
 
After the Asian financial crisis, the IMF and US Treasury blamed the Asians for “crony 
capitalism” and announced the need for more transparency, especially, in the banking 
sector. When the developing countries indicated that one of the problems in tracing the 
money flows was bank secrecy in offshore Western banks, the tone of the US changed 
and the transparency issue was not discussed much anymore (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 208-
209). However, during the crisis Malaysia did make several improvements to increase 
the transparency in the financial sector and stock markets (Mahathir, 1999, pp. 106-109), 
which might indicate that some of the criticism was accurate and the banks could have 
been more transparent. Also, in Indonesia there has been clear evidence that during the 
Suharto’s era corruption and nepotism were not unknown characteristics and some fault 
behind the crisis may lie on the country’s unwillingness to reform (Habir, 1999, p. 198).  
Nevertheless, the crisis can hardly be blamed solely on corruption and lack of transpar-
ency, since these elements were there long before the crisis, and some of the blame can 
be shifted to the US as well since it failed to advice the countries on the importance of 
monitoring the banks when it advertised the benefits of free markets. (Johnson, 2000, 
pp. 207-210) 
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6.8 Conditionality 
 
One concern with the IMF and the World Bank is that as a return of providing loans, they 
insist that the countries fulfill several conditions and usually in a very tight schedule. A 
country may need to change its legislation quickly to be able to bankrupt firms or banks, 
change financial systems or reform social security schemes. The enormous number of 
conditions has often distracted governments from more vital tasks, and the time to struc-
ture the economy in the long run or attacking the actual problems has been minimized 
(Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 14-15). In Indonesia, the IMF insisted on 117 activities that the gov-
ernment had to implement by specific deadline in order to receive the funding 
(Emmerson, 1999, p. 324). 
 
The IMF and World Bank have later admitted that they might have gone overboard with 
the number of conditions in some cases, and during the 2000s they have started to re-
duce the amount of conditions. Conditionality also weakens the countries’ democracy, 
when decisions are taken out of the hands of the politicians, usually democratically voted 
members of the community, and turned over to a third party. (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 14-15, 
56). 
 
6.9 Summary of Chapter 6 
 
The general criticism toward IMF has concentrated on the concentrated power the US 
has within the organization and its inability to communicate with the lending countries. It 
is blamed for lacking transparency and there is no authority who it would be accountable 
for. Its methods seem to be more concerned about bailing out the foreign lenders than 
actually supporting the citizens of the lending countries, and the vast amount of condi-
tions it has insisted on to receive the loan. 
 
It major difficulties in Asia were the insistence of closing down several banks and the 
inability to understand the importance of bankruptcy laws and the role of the government 
with the procedures. The IMF also failed to understand that its promotion towards capital 
market liberalization was one of the biggest reasons that led to the huge extent of the 
crisis. Malaysia’s method to boost the economy and increase government intervention in 
several areas gives an exceptional possibility for comparing the different set of policies. 
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Since Malaysia recovered from the crisis relatively fast and was able to keep its unem-
ployment and poverty rates down, the Malaysian view of tackling the crisis seemed to be 
quite successful in a lot of areas, and made the IMF’s policies rather questionable.  
 
7 Developing the IMF 
 
The previous chapters have been focusing the reasons behind the crisis and the different 
implementations the countries used to survive the crisis, as well as critique towards IMF. 
The IMF has admitted some of its faults, and has already made some small changes, 
which will be explained in this chapter in more detail. However, there is still room for 
improvement. The following subchapters will introduce few ideas how the IMF could de-
velop its current strategies and gives focus points to the areas that are recognized as 
weaknesses in the IMF. 
 
7.1 IMF Admitting Its Faults and Changes 
 
There have been some questions to reform or change the IMF. In 1999, while the Asian 
financial crisis was still in progress, some of the countries pleaded in the World Economic 
Forum to change the IMF and reform it, making it more attuned to the economies’ con-
ditions and the reality of poverty. However, the US blocked all these suggestions 
(Johnson, 2000, p. 226). 
 
Nevertheless, since then the IMF has admitted that not all its policies have been suc-
cessful. In March 2003, the IMF admitted in its report that globalization may actually 
increase the risk of financial crisis in the developing countries since countries get more 
vulnerable to outside fluctuations. The importance of safety nets and controllable finan-
cial integration should be implemented in its policies (Prasad;Rogoff;Wei;& Kose, 2003). 
It has also admitted that the rapid market liberalization was harmful to the Asian econo-
mies and instead of growth led to instability (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 90). In addition, the IMF 
and the World Bank have acknowledged that in some cases they have made too many 
conditions to their loan programs and since 2000 they have tried to reduce them (Stiglitz, 
2006, pp. 14-15). The IMF has also declared that more country specific policies should 
be implemented with its policies. However since the general policies have stayed the 
same, the measures to accomplish this have been quite moderate (Shah, 2013). 
 
To silence the criticism towards the voting right, the IMF divided 3 percent of the devel-
oped countries votes to the less developed countries in 2012. It hoped that, this would 
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ease the pressure from the critiques and developing countries about their possibilities to 
affect to the decision-making. Nonetheless this has not settled the critiques, and more 
transparency and accountability is demanded. (Shah, 2013) 
 
7.2 Understanding Cultural Differences 
 
Even though the IMF has reported that it tries to make more country specific policies and 
involve the countries more to its decision, little evidence and actual restructuring of IMF’s 
actions are not well seen. One of examples is the IMF’s involvement with the recent 
Greek crisis. Together with the European Union (EU) they pushed austerity measures 
which led to protests and political shifts. The Greeks are opposing the measures taken 
by the IMF and EU, but the IMF has not been able to really negotiate with the Greeks 
and adjust its methods. (Mody, 2017) 
 
The US has often also undermined the Asian style of leading and the high government 
intervention. That is one of the reasons it promoted the free capital movement and glob-
alization policies. However, when countries with different backgrounds and cultures are 
pushed to one mold the outcome seldom is victorious in a long run. That is why the IMF’s 
agenda to force countries to the US way of thinking or impose controversial regulations 
to countries with different legal, economic and political systems should be diminished. 
The IMF has already used billions of dollars to attempt to repair damages that the US 
globalization agenda has caused and when trying to repair the problem it often makes 
the countries even more distressed.  In this context Malaysia was able to undermine the 
US policies and rather increased the faith to the Asian style economics than the US style 
capitalism. (Johnson, 2000, pp. 225-226) 
 
7.3 Bailouts for Lenders 
 
As discussed earlier the bailouts are enabling the lenders to make more riskier decisions 
and receive their money even when the country is in bankruptcy. As creditors refuse to 
default on their bad investment decisions, the entire country can be affected. The alter-
native could be that the lenders simply default the bad loans and suffer the conse-
quences. The problem in East Asia’s case was that few of the countries had sufficient 
legal frameworks to address bankruptcies. The IMF has tried to impose some creditor-
friendly bankruptcy laws to the developing countries that had asked for its funding. How-
ever, the ability to make a single right law for bankruptcies for different countries and 
situations has failed. Nevertheless, if bankruptcies are prolonged, the companies may 
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remain in ambiguous stage too long, where no one actually owns the company, making 
it easy for the management to strip the assets during that time (Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 231-
233). The importance of well-established bankruptcy laws is a major factor in the lending 
and banking community and Malaysia gave a good example of resolving the legal issue 
quickly and relatively effectively with the government establishing immediate procedures 
to address the matter (Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 117-118). Based on this, the IMF should con-
centrate more, not to the lenders, but rather to the economy as a whole and ensure the 
countries legal framework are in a state that can tackle problems such as bankruptcies 
(Stiglitz, 2006, pp. 231-233). 
 
7.4 Keynesian Ideology 
 
Even though the IMF is partly built on the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, the IMF has 
lost some of the Keynesian objectives somewhere along the line. Keynes suggested that 
governments’ solutions to recover from recessions should be increasing their spending, 
and lowering taxes and interest rates. The IMF’s conditions, however, are often just the 
opposite. Basically, everywhere the IMF has tried to implement its ideas, they have 
failed, such as in Asia and Latin America. Especially the high interest rates, set to stabi-
lize the exchange rate, pose a problem, since higher interest rates lead to a higher debt 
burden, forcing countries to borrow more and more to be able to pay the interest pay-
ments. The high interest rates usually do not stabilize the exchange rate either, making 
them useless in the first place (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 235). The IMF could recall the Keynesian 
lessons and instead of austerity and high interests they could try to find ways to stimulate 
the affected economies, as Malaysia did during the crisis. 
 
7.5 Summary of Chapter 7 
 
The IMF has admitted some of its mistakes with prior crises and has made some adjust-
ments since. However, the actual development has been quite modest. It could still im-
prove their understanding of different countries cultures and change their policies ac-
cordingly. Their current policies have not been successful and still they have done little 
to change them. They have gone far from the original Keynesian ideas, which promote 
lowering the interest rates, increasing government expenditure and reducing taxes. In 
addition the funds it provides to the countries are often used to bail out the foreign lend-
ers, who have done bad investment decision rather than actually helping the countries’ 
economies or citizens. The other root would be to help countries to improve the legal 
framework needed and let the investors to bear their responsibilities as well.   
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8 Conclusion 
 
To conclude the Asian financial crisis had severe effects on the Asian economies, and 
many countries struggled quite long to recover from the crisis. The influence the US had 
cannot be undermined, while their endorsement towards the open economies and US 
style capitalism was one of the most influential factors that made the countries so vul-
nerable. 
 
When comparing Indonesia and Malaysia, it seems that Malaysia might have recovered 
from the crisis a bit faster, but currently are quite equal when it comes to financial per-
formance, such as GDP growth, exchange rate, inflation and FDI, but when comparing 
more social aspects, such as employment, poverty and inequality, Malaysia has really 
outperformed Indonesia.  
 
Malaysia was able to achieve GDP growth faster than Indonesia, but currently their 
growth rates are quite similar and Indonesia has been more successful in luring in foreign 
direct investment, which indicates that Indonesia might also succeed in growing in the 
future. However the Malaysian government succeeded to keep its country more stable 
and inflation in reasonable levels. Indonesia’s high inflation during the crisis harmed es-
pecially the poor and it is obvious that Malaysia has been more successful to distribute 
the wealth more evenly to all its citizens. Especially descriptive is the Gini coefficient, 
which Malaysia has been able to reduce every year, while in the same time Indonesia is 
in different path, growing the gap between the rich and poor. The nations poverty ratios 
are also in different scale, even though Indonesia’s poverty numbers were higher in the 
first place, it has not succeeded to lower the ratio much and the poverty soared during 
the crisis. Malaysia has been able to spread its income more equally and the poverty has 
been reduced to quite minimum levels. One factor that might explain the high number of 
poverty in Indonesia is the fast-growing unemployment rates during the crisis, and the 
countries inability to reduce them quickly. The Malaysia’s unemployment rate on the 
other hand was not highly influenced by the crisis, and the unemployment was at quite 
stable levels during the whole crisis. The government’s attempts to stimulate the econ-
omy succeeded in this matter and the citizens were not so devastated during and after 
the crisis. 
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Nevertheless, the comparable factors were quite difficult to determine, and not all data 
from both countries were available, which also reduced the ability to analyze the coun-
tries differences. In addition, it is difficult to say if Indonesia would have resulted in any 
different if it would have refused the IMF’s help. Some evidence suggests that, especially 
the closing of the banks was harmful, but if Indonesia would not have been influenced 
by the IMF it is impossible to say what would have been its national measures to over-
come the crisis. However, if Indonesia could have been able to use the same methods 
than Malaysia to overcome the crisis, the poverty and unemployment levels might have 
been different. IMF reduced government spending and while doing so it cut off the sub-
sidies for the poorest and cancelled several projects, making the unemployment and 
poverty rates soar. Malaysia did just the opposite, funding critical industries and made 
efforts to keep interest rates and inflation down. 
 
Also, the IMF’s idea that the free markets would correct themselves and that there was 
no reason for government intervention led the country to face more instability and capital 
flowed out of the country. The Malaysia took another approach and government took 
control over the capital market, to reduce the money escaping offshore and remain its 
liquidity. Eventually, even the IMF had to admit that the rapid freeing of the markets was 
harmful to the East Asian countries and the opening up should have been made more 
moderately, while ensuring the legal framework would be sufficient enough to tolerate 
market volatilities. 
 
The IMF has admitted that not all of its policies have been successful and it has made 
some efforts to change.  The poverty reduction has now come part of its agenda, it is 
making efforts to reduce the conditionality and make more country specific policies. Nev-
ertheless, improvements can still be made, the developing countries are still underrepre-
sented in the IMF, and the policies can be rigid and intolerant towards the lending coun-
tries cultures and situation. The strategies often help the foreign lenders more than the 
countries citizens. When comparing the way the crisis in developed countries are han-
dled to the policies used in developing countries, it is difficult to see the reasoning behind 
those strategies. One way the IMF could help ease the criticism, would be more open-
ness, transparency and co-operation with the affected countries.  
 
Overall, the Malaysia’s governments interventions and stimulating the economy seemed 
to stabilize the economy quicker and better than the remedies IMF offered to Indonesia. 
Much have been learned from the East Asia’s, and the more recent global crisis, and as 
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any organization the IMF has developed during the years. The situation in every country 
and with every crisis is a bit different so the cure should be changing as well and Malaysia 
was one of those few who could show us the alternative path and succeeded in it. 
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